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We consider a simplified version of the Wealth Game, which is an agent-based financial market
model with many interesting features resembling the real stock market. Market makers are not
present in the game so that the majority traders are forced to reduce the amount of stocks they
trade, in order to have a balance in the supply and demand. The strategy space is also simplified
so that the market is only left with strategies resembling the decisions of optimistic or pessimistic
fundamentalists and trend-followers in the real stock market. A dynamical phase transition between
a trendsetters’ phase and a bouncing phase is discovered in the space of price sensitivity and market
impact. Analysis based on a semi-empirical approach explains the phase transition and locates the
phase boundary. A phase transition is also observed when the fraction of trend-following strategies
increases, which can be explained macroscopically by matching the supply and demand of stocks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent remarkable trend in the physics community is
its engagement in interdisciplinary fields using physics-
inspired techniques. Econophysics is one such area in
which financial markets are simulated by agent-based
models in much the same way as other many-body sys-
tems in statistical physics. The Minority Game (MG) [1]
is an agent-based model based on the insight that agents
making minority decisions in markets can take advan-
tage of other agents. Due to its success in capturing the
profit-seeking behavior of agents, it became the progen-
itor of a family of agent-based models [2], which study
various aspects of market behavior, such as volatility [3],
noise [4], market-clearing mechanisms [5], and anticipa-
tive strategies [6].
The market behavior depends on the way the agents
evaluate their strategies when they make choices among
them to take actions. In early versions of the minor-
ity games, agents evaluate their strategies using various
virtual points or scores. Typical virtual point updating
rules, such as those in the original MG [1], evaluate the
buying and selling decisions at a time step, regardless
of the need to update the historical effects of the pre-
vious decisions. In other models, one-step expectations
of the agents are considered, leading to the $-game [6].
There are also market models with a mixture of trend-
following and fundamentalist agents [7, 8] or markets
with crossover regimes dominated by trend-following and
fundamentalist strategies [9, 10]. As pointed out in [12],
these models do not reflect the history-dependent consid-
erations of real market agents.
Improved versions of the minority games considered
agents using virtual wealth to evaluate their strategies
[11]. The Wealth Game (WG) [12] was introduced to
overcome this deficiency. Agents in WG evaluate their
strategies by calculating their virtual wealth, that is,
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the wealth (including cash and stocks) that the strate-
gies would bring were their recommendations completely
adopted in history. The most significant advantage of
this evaluation method can be seen when agents are al-
lowed to make holding decisions (that is, decisions to take
no buying or selling actions). In WG, the virtual wealth
due to holding long (short) positions increases when stock
prices are rising (dropping). On the other hand, virtual
point updates in the original MG are neutral to hold-
ing positions. Tests with real market and artificial data
confirm the versatility of wealth-based strategies [12, 13].
A consequence of using wealth-based strategies in
WG is the emergence of price cycles through the self-
organization of the different types of agents. This is both
an important and interesting issue, since it sheds light on
the formation and disappearance of bubbles and crashes
in real financial markets. Giardina and Bouchaud consid-
ered a model with bubbles and crashes in the price trend
of the market [14]. The behavior was explained in terms
of the interplay between the trend-following and funda-
mentalist behaviors of the agents, but the mechanism of
the disappearance of this periodic phase remains an open
issue. In WG, the roles of the trendsetters and fickle
agents in sustaining the price cycles were explained, and
the disappearance of the periodic phase was attributed
to the failure of the trendsetters to gain wealth from the
fickle agents. (The trendsetters are synonymous to the
trend-followers in the literature, but are renamed trend-
setters to emphasize their role in initiating the bubbles
and crashes.) However, this picture assumes the pres-
ence of market makers, who manage to fulfill buy and
sell orders irrespective of the order imbalance. This is
not applicable to the stock market, since in the absence of
market makers, the market clearing mechanism requires
an exact matching of buy and sell orders. Consequently,
not all agents can have their buying or selling orders ful-
filled. Thus, the unfulfilled buyers (sellers) would re-
peat their bids (asks) step after step. This creates a
much stronger tendency for the price to go monotonically
upwards (downwards). The appearance of the periodic
phase becomes questionable and, if it exists, its mecha-
nism of formation and disappearance may not necessarily
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2be the same.
In this paper, we study a simplified model of WG in
the absence of market makers, focusing on the mecha-
nism creating and destroying the cycles of bubbles and
crashes. We will adopt a minimalist approach, and con-
sider the simple but essential elements that contribute
to the studied mechanism. It turns out that with trend-
followers and fundamentalists of memory size 2 being the
two main groups of investors, the price dynamics already
exhibits many interesting features. (The fundamentalists
are further divided into optimistic and pessimistic sub-
groups.) On one hand, these groups are inclusive enough
to represent the attitudes of most investors, and on the
other hand, simple enough to enable convenient analyses.
Despite the simplification, we will see that many impor-
tant features and phase transitions in the original WG
with market makers are preserved. Rich econophysical
implications are revealed regardless of the simplifications.
This paper is outlined as follows. After introducing the
model in Sec. II, we describe different attractor behav-
iors in the space of price sensitivity and market impact in
Sec. III. Analytical studies about the phase transitions,
including the cause of the transition and the precise lo-
cation of the phase boundary, are discussed in Sec. IV to
VI. In Sec. VII, we study the dependence of the attractor
behavior on the fraction of trend-followers, accompanied
by a concise analytical study about the corresponding
phase transition. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Sec.
VIII.
II. THE MODEL
The Wealth Game [12] consists of N agents playing
in a single-commodity market. For convenience, we will
use the language of stock markets in the following discus-
sions. At each time step, the agents make decisions to
buy, sell, or hold (no action) stocks, based on the predic-
tions of their best strategies. The decision of agent i at
time t is denoted as ai(t) = 1,−1, 0, which corresponds
to buy, sell or hold respectively. A strategy takes the the
signs of previous m historical price changes (represented
by a string of ↑ and ↓) as the input signal, and the output
signal is the advice on the trading action of the present
step. Table I shows the possible content of a strategy for
m = 2. We require each usable strategy to have at least
one buying and one selling prediction, or else it is too
dull to be used. With this restriction, s strategies are
randomly drawn to each agent.
The position of agent i at time t is given by
ki(t) =
t∑
t′=0
ai(t
′), (1)
which records the number of stocks possessed by an
agent. Short selling is allowed, such that ki(t) can be
negative. We assume that each agent has limited assets,
so the restriction |ki(t)| ≤ K is applied, i.e. actions that
TABLE I: The content of a typical strategy for m = 2.
Input signal Output Signal (advice)
↑↑ Buy
↑↓ Sell
↓↑ Hold
↓↓ Sell
further increase |ki(t)| to exceed K are ignored, and so K
denotes the maximum number of stocks that an agent can
buy or short sell. The market price evolves in response
to the market’s excess demand A(t), which is defined as
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ai(t), (2)
and the price is updated by
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + sgn[A(t)]|A(t)|γ , (3)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the market sensitivity controlling how
sensitively the price changes with the market excess de-
mand. γ = 0 corresponds to a step function [1, 3, 5] while
γ = 1 corresponds to a linear function [15–18]. Suppose
an agent would like to buy a stock at price P (t). Then
she queues up in the market to wait for her turn of a
transaction. Depending on how long the queue is, the
actual transaction price PT(t) may deviate from her de-
sired price P (t). This is one of the examples showing
how the market impact (i.e. the collection of all the mar-
ket factors imposed by agents’ participation) would in-
fluence the agents’ trading activities [11]. In this model,
the transaction price is defined as
PT(t) = (1− β)P (t) + βP (t+ 1), (4)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the market impact. For convenience,
we assume that all the agents are affected to the same
extent by market impact. If β = 0, the market impact
is small so that the agent can immediately trade with
her most desired price. When β = 1, the queue is so
long (and the market impact is so large) that the agent
is actually trading with P (t+1), which may have already
deviated considerably from P (t).
The wealth of an agent consists of two parts: cash in
her hand and the value of stocks she is holding. Agents’
cash is updated by
ci(t) = ci(t− 1)− ai(t)PT(t), (5)
while the agents’ wealth at the moment they just finish
the transactions at time t, is defined as
wi(t) = ci(t) + ki(t)PT(t). (6)
Among the s strategies, an agent only chooses one to
follow at each time step. The virtual position, cash and
wealth of a strategy will be calculated in the same way as
3an agent, by Eqs. (1) (a strategy is also restricted by K),
(5) and (6). Its virtual wealth evolves when its predic-
tion is applied in the market. The best strategy is then
defined as the one with the highest accumulated virtual
wealth, which is to be adopted by the agent. When a pre-
viously best strategy is outperformed, switching strate-
gies by agents occurs.
A. Market without Market Makers
The original Wealth Game implicitly assumes the par-
ticipation of market makers. This means that when there
are more buyers than sellers, market makers will provide
stocks to the excess buyers, and when there are more
sellers than buyers, they will absorb the extra stocks.
Withdrawing the market makers from the game implies
that the supply and demand cannot be balanced. To
achieve a balance, an apparent way is to randomly pick
some excess majority traders and ignore their orders. For
the sake of fairness, however, we assume that all the ma-
jority traders reduce their orders such that all of them
can only be partially satisfied [14, 19, 20].
The mathematical modification to the original game is
as follows. The quotation of agent i (j) who wants to
buy (sell) is defined as
qbuyi = min(1,K − ki), (7)
qsellj = −min(1,K + kj). (8)
The quotation is the amount of stock an agent wants to
trade. It is defined this way since the agents can now buy
(sell) a fraction of their original units of stock, and the
stocks held (short sold) by each agent are still required
to be bounded by the maximum position K. We define
the sum of buying (selling) quotations as
Abuy =
∑
i
qbuyi , (9)
Asell =
∑
j
qsellj . (10)
The modification to the excess demand A(t) for Eq. (2)
is
A(t) =
N∑
l=1
ql(t) = Abuy +Asell. (11)
When A(t) is positive, the position change of a buying
(selling) agent after each transaction is
∆kbuyi =
( |Asell|
Abuy
)
qi, (12)
∆ksellj = qj . (13)
When A(t) is negative,
∆kbuyi = qi, (14)
∆ksellj =
(
Abuy
|Asell|
)
qj . (15)
Based on the above modifications, one could easily verify
that the supply and demand can be balanced at any time
step. Note that, now the market price change is solely
driven by agents’ bid-ask actions, regardless of whether
transactions are really carried out afterwards. This is the
cause of so called unfulfilled orders [14], “dry quoting”.
In this case, there is only one quoting group (e.g. the
bidding group) who cannot find their matching dealers.
This essentially resembles the circumstance of a market
when the price fluctuation is significant but the trading
volume is negligible. It should also be emphasized that
the absence of market makers implies that the market is
zero-sum, which means the total wealth of all the agents
is conserved, as the gain of an agent must be accompanied
by the loss of another agent.
For the updating of the virtual positions of the strate-
gies, one may either use the original scheme of ∆kξ = ±1
subject to the constraints of the maximum and minimum
positions ±K, or use the modified scheme analogous to
Eqs. (7), (8), (12) - (15). In this paper we use the orig-
inal scheme, and have checked that both schemes yield
qualitatively similar results.
B. Cash Rule
It was found that merely withdrawing the market mak-
ers from the game only creates uninteresting market dy-
namics. Due to the imbalance between supply and de-
mand, majority traders can only be partially satisfied.
Time step after time step, they quote again and again,
boosting (busting) the price monotonically and creates
an ever increasing (decreasing) trend.
To get rid of this undesirable feature in our model, we
need to take into account the inability of the agents to
order when the stock price is too high or low. Hence we
propose that the agents are forced to cease their quota-
tions if the following conditions are satisfied:
cbuyi (t)− P (t) < 0, (16)
csellj (t) + P (t) < 0, (17)
where the superscripts buy and sell stand for buyers and
sellers respectively. Condition (16) is essentially saying
that agents who have too little cash would not bother to
go for queuing if the price is too high. Condition (17)
means that if the price is too low, agents who are not
liquid enough would not take the risk to borrow stocks.
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FIG. 1: The price series of an artificial trendy market. Dif-
ferent strategies make different decisions.
C. Strategies: Fast Trendsetters, Top and Bottom
Triggers
To facilitate analyses, the strategy space of the game
is simplified in the following ways. First, the outputs
of a strategy are restricted to buying and selling only.
No holding actions are included. An agent stops quoting
only when she tries to place a buying (selling) quota-
tion but the restriction |ki| = K is reached, or when she
is restricted by the Cash Rule (i.e. conditions (16) or
(17) are satisfied). The direct consequence is that the
total number of possible strategies becomes 22
m
instead
of 32
m
. Second, we only study the special case where an
agent has two strategies (s = 2) and considers two histor-
ical price changes as the strategy input signal (m = 2).
Hence there are 22
m
= 16 strategies. We further focus
on those strategies with opposite decisions for inputs ↑↓
and ↓↑. This reduces the set of strategies to those listed
in Table II and their antistrategies. They are called fast
trendsetters (F), top trigger (T), bottom trigger (B) and
slow trendsetters (S) respectively. The meanings of these
names will become clear in the next paragraphs. Further-
more, studies in the original Wealth Game shows that S
strategy plays similar role as the F strategy in the for-
mation of price cycles. Hence, we restrict the strategy
space, and only three strategies are evenly assigned to
the agents, namely, the F, T and B strategies.
We now consider the outputs of these three strategies
in an artificial trendy market, as shown in Fig. 1.
A glance at the content of the F strategy suggests that
it is a trend-believing strategy. The F strategy advises
to buy in a rising trend, sell at the price peak, sell in a
falling trend and buy at the price valley. Once a suffi-
ciently long price trend (either rising or falling) has been
established, the F strategy gains most wealth and hence
would be adopted by most agents. If this trend-believing
strategy is adopted by the majority, the price trends can
be set up persistently. In the literature, it is called the
trend-follower [5–10, 14, 21]. Here, to highlight its role in
perpetuating the price cycles, it is called the “trendset-
ter”. It is “fast” as agents adopting it react immediately
to reversals in the price trend in a trendy market, in con-
trast to the slow trendsetters who join the trendsetting
bandwagon one step slower, according to the outputs pre-
scribed in Table II for inputs ↑↓ and ↓↑.
The T and B strategies have a fundamentalist charac-
ter. The T strategy gives buying advice in response to
all inputs, except when the price trend reaches a peak,
that is, when the signal is ↑↓. Combined with the posi-
tions bounds, an agent following its advice prefers to stay
in a long position. Therefore it can be considered as an
optimistic fundamentalist. Fundamentalists believe that
the price should not deviate from a fundamental value.
When the price is lower, they try to stick to long po-
sitions. The T strategy is optimistic because it targets
a relatively high fundamental value signaled by a price
peak. In the original Wealth Game, the selling actions
advised by the T strategies help to trigger the falling
trends in price cycles. Hence they are called the “top
trigger”.
Similarly, the B strategy gives selling advice in re-
sponse to all inputs, except when the input is ↓↑. It
is pessimistic since it prefers to stick to a short position
and buys only when the price reaches a valley.
In summary, we are studying a model in which each
agent is equipped with two strategies; each of them may
either be a trend-following (F) strategy or a fundamen-
talist one (either optimistic (T) or pessimistic (B)). Note
that the virtual wealth of a strategy is not influenced
by the Cash Rule and the absence of market makers,
meaning that an agent evaluates it solely according to
the original Wealth Game (Eqs. (1), (5) and (6)) and as-
sumes that the virtual transaction of a strategy is always
successful. We also note that the game is invariant under
the gauge transformation mapping the ↑ and ↓ signals to
each other and the buy and sell decisions to each other.
III. PHASE DIAGRAM
We study the behavior of the game by starting from
a set of unbiased initial conditions. Each agent has the
same initial cash co and do not hold any stocks initially
(ki (0) = 0), so that the initial wealth of each agent is
wi (0) = co. The initial stock price is P (0) = 0, and
the initial virtual wealth of all strategies σ is wσ (0) =
0. To avoid ambiguous decisions when more than one
strategies have the same virtual wealth during the game,
one of the 3! priority orderings of F, T and B is randomly
chosen before the game starts. We call this “throwing
the public dice”. To initiate the game dynamics, one
of the four historical price signals (↑↑, ↑↓, ↓↑ or ↓↓) is
randomly chosen. Considering the choices in the public
dice and the price signal, there are 24 possible sets of
initial conditions. Due to the gauge symmetry in the
5TABLE II: The F, T, B and S strategies.
F strategy T strategy B strategy S strategy
Input Output
↑↑ Buy
↑↓ Sell
↓↑ Buy
↓↓ Sell
Input Output
↑↑ Buy
↑↓ Sell
↓↑ Buy
↓↓ Buy
Input Output
↑↑ Sell
↑↓ Sell
↓↑ Buy
↓↓ Sell
Input Output
↑↑ Buy
↑↓ Buy
↓↑ Sell
↓↓ Sell
game, there are 12 distinct initial conditions.
The steady state behavior of the game can be sum-
marized in the phase diagram in Fig. 2 in the space of
price sensitivity γ and market impact β. The space is
divided into two phases: the trendsetters’ (TS) phase at
low γ and the bouncing (BO) phase at high γ. When the
initial cash co increases, the TS phase expands. We also
observe that the phase transition is weakly dependent on
the market impact β, which implies that the market is
dominated by dry quoting. Typical time series of the
price in the attractors of these phases are shown in Fig.
3. The corresponding virtual wealth of the F, T and B
strategies are shown in Fig. 4.
We remark that the phase transition in Fig. 2 is a
dynamical rather than a generic transition. The occur-
rence and the position of the transition is specific to the
unbiased initial condition described above. Starting with
other initial conditions, or introducing perturbations to
the dynamics, we can obtain the bouncing attractor in
the trendsetters’ phase and vice versa. For example, we
have done numerical experiments by starting from the
TS phase and gradually increasing γ until we reach the
BO phase, but we observe that the TS attractor remains
stable. Similar annealing experiments from the BO phase
to the TS phase also show that the BO attractor can be
stable in the TS phase.
In another set of experiments, we first prepare the TS
attractor in the TS phase, and then inject virtual cash to
the B strategy so that the BO attractor is favored. We
observe that for all values of γ, stable BO attractors can
be formed when the amount of injected virtual cash is
sufficiently large. In the converse experiment, we inject
virtual cash to the F strategy in the BO attractor in
the BO phase. When co is high so that the BO phase
is narrow, stable TS attractors are formed at all values
of γ when the level of injected virtual cash is sufficiently
high. However, when co is low and the BO phase is broad,
we found that at high values of γ, stable TS attractors
cannot be formed no matter how much virtual cash is
injected. This indicates that the conditions for forming
the TS attractor are probably more restrictive than the
BO attractor, and the existence phase of the TS attractor
may be studied using approaches to generic transitions.
However, this transition is not relevant to the dynamical
transitions starting from the unbiased initial conditions
discussed in this paper.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The phase diagram in the space of
price sensitivity γ and market impact β for (a) co = 100, and
(b) co = 925. Other parameters are m = 2, s = 2, K = 3,
N = 1000 (20 samples).
A. The Bouncing Phase
In the bouncing phase, the dominant strategy is either
T or B. In the example shown in Fig. 3(b), the dominant
strategy is B. Its dynamics is one large upward jump in
price, followed by one or several steps of zero change, and
a downward jump in several small steps or one large step.
It reflects the desire of the agents who buy stocks to take
advantage of a low price, but the price trend is prevented
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FIG. 3: The time dependence of price for a typical sample
with m = 2, s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100 for (a) the
trendsetters’ phase at (γ, β) = (0.2, 0.2), (b) the bouncing
phase at (γ, β) = (0.7, 0.2).
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FIG. 4: The virtual wealth of the F, T and B strategies in (a)
the TS attractor at (γ, β) = (0.2, 0.2), (b) the BO attractor
at (γ, β) = (0.7, 0.2). Parameters: m = 2, s = 2, K = 3,
N = 1000, co = 100.
from rising further due to the prevailing pessimistic at-
mosphere of the market.
The virtual wealth of the strategies are shown in Fig.
4(b). Since the B strategy gains profit from buying im-
mediately before the large upward jump and selling after-
wards, it becomes the dominant strategy. The T strat-
egy also gains profit from selling immediately before the
downward jumps and buying at a lower price. Hence
its virtual wealth also increases with time, but at a rate
slower than that of the B strategy. On the other hand,
since the F strategy cannot gain wealth in a price series
with frequent trend reversals, it becomes a losing strat-
egy.
Besides the up-bouncing example shown in Fig. 3(b),
down-bouncing dynamics dominated by the T strategy
can also be observed, depending on the initial conditions.
Using the gauge symmetry of the game, their mechanism
can be explained similarly.
B. The Trendsetters’ Phase
This is the phase that gives rise to bubbles and crashes
in the cycles of stock prices [12, 14]. As shown in Fig.
3(a), the price series consists of alternating long rising
and falling trends. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the vir-
tual wealth of the F strategy rises continuously due to
its trendy decisions, with minor setbacks when the price
trend reverses. On the other hand, the T and B strate-
gies oscillate about their average at the frequency of the
price oscillations. Since the T strategy mainly takes a
long position, its virtual wealth is higher than that of
the B strategy during the upper half of the price cycle.
Similarly, the B strategy has a higher virtual wealth dur-
ing the lower half of the price cycle. The T strategy gains
wealth by selling at the peak and buying back at a lower
price the next step, and the B strategy gains wealth by
buying at the price minimum and selling at a higher price
at the next step. Hence their average also has a slowly
rising trend.
In the absence of market makers, the steady state is
dominated by dry quotations. Hence the cash of different
agents becomes stationary when the system equilibrates.
For s = 2, there are six types of agents. Those holding
two F strategies are denoted as FF agents, and the other
five types are FT, FB, TT, TB and BB agents. In the
steady state, agents can be roughly categorized as the
active groups (including FF, FT and FB agents) and the
inactive group (including TT, TB and BB agents). The
active group usually has a relatively large amount of cash,
so that the price movement is mostly due to their par-
ticipation in the quoting activities. The inactive agents
usually have little cash, or have already reached the po-
sition bounds (|ki| = K), so that their quotations would
usually be terminated by the Cash Rule or the position
bounds. Due to the unavailability of participation of the
inactive group, real transactions cannot materialize as
the active agents cannot find matching dealers. Thus in
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FIG. 5: A typical trendsetters’ attractor showing (a) the price
evolvement, (b) the evolvements of the total buying and sell-
ing quotations. The parameters are (γ, β) = (0.2, 0.2), m = 2,
s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100.
this phase, the price movement is solely caused by dry
quoting.
The TS attractor is generally divided into four stages
as shown in Fig. 5. In stage 1, all active agents place
buying quotes and thus the price is boosted up with the
steepest slope. Stage 2 starts when the price has reached
a level higher than the cash level of some of the active
agents, whose quoting actions are terminated by the Cash
Rule, leading to a decrease in the rate of price evolve-
ment. Stage 2 ends when the price is higher than the
cash level of the most liquid active agents. A quiet step
(i.e. a time step with zero price change) follows as no one
quotes. Since the price change is zero, a random signal
is generated as the signal input for the next step. If ↑ is
generated, another quiet step follows, until a ↓ signal is
randomly generated, triggering a falling trend. Stages 3
and 4 are duplicates of stages 1 and 2 under the gauge
transformation.
In Fig. 5, note that the transition from stage 1 to 2 (or
from stage 3 to 4) is not apparent in the price series. This
is because TS attractors exist at low γ, where the price
change is weakly sensitive to the excess demand A(t).
In the following sections, we will analyze the behavior
of the TS attractor, leading eventually to an estimation
of the phase transition point.
IV. THE TRANSIENT PERIOD
In contrast to the trendsetter attractor in [12], the
TS attractor in the absence of market makers is domi-
nated by dry quotations. This implies that the amount
of cash held by each agent becomes stationary at the
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The cash evolvements of different
agents and the price series in type I TS attractor for (a)
the asymptotic time series, (b) the transient, which is fur-
ther divided into the quasi-stable stage and the separation
stage, and (c) the separation stage. The parameters are
(γ, β) = (0.2, 0.8), m = 2, s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100,
initial conditions (↓↓, B > F > T).
steady state. As will be confirmed in the next section,
the period of the price cycles depends on the cash level of
the most liquid agent. Hence, the steady state behavior
of the price cycles directly depends no how the transient
dynamics redistributes the cash into the hands of the
different types of agents. This heavy dependence on the
transient dynamics is the characteristics of the Wealth
Game without market makers.
A typical price series is shown in Fig. 6 when the
initial cash co is sufficiently large that we are not very
close to the phase boundary. At the beginning of the
transient stage, a significant redistribution of cash starts
to take place in the first half of the quasi-period of the
price series. We refer to this as the separation stage. Fol-
lowing the separation stage, the cash levels are roughly
flat with occasional jumps, whose magnitudes are pro-
gressively smaller. We call this the quasi-stable stage.
Eventually, the cash levels become stable at the steady
state.
8At the first few steps of the separation stage, the price
rises from zero. Some real transactions take place, but
since the price is close to zero, the cash levels of the
agents do not change much and are roughly equal to co.
After several steps, the major sellers (the BB agents)
have reached the minimum position of −K. Dry quoting
happens again and again, until the price is just higher
than co, at where the agents think the stock is too ex-
pensive. The price stops rising and when a downward
signal appears, all agents make selling quotations. In the
next step, the signal ↓↓ first appears after the quiet pe-
riod. Both buying and selling quotations are made by
the agents. This is the time when there is a significant
redistribution of cash among the agents.
Subsequent to this event, there is a rising or falling
price trend depending on the excess demand at the event.
For attractors obtained from the initial condition used in
Fig. 6, which will be classified as type I attractor, the
price follows a rising trend, hits a peak when it goes above
the cash level of the most liquid agents. No transactions
can be fulfilled as the major sellers (BB) have reached
the minimum position already, and the price goes on a
falling trend. For other initial conditions, the price fol-
lows a falling trend directly after the event. In all cases,
such price movements are not accompanied by any real
transactions, as the price is higher than the cash levels
of the buying group. Hence, no cash redistribution takes
place for many time steps.
For type I attractors, the second significant cash redis-
tribution takes place when the price falls below the cash
level of the second most liquid group of agents.
In the quasi-stable stage, real transactions can only
materialize when the price is close to zero, allowing the
inactive agents to participate with their low cash levels.
When this happens, the cash levels of the agents fluctuate
little bit. These fluctuations are so minor that we can
neglect their effects on the final stable cash levels.
Hence we can focus on the cash evolvements in the
separation stage to calculate the approximate stable cash
levels and hence the amplitude of the price cycles. For
the initial condition in Fig. 6, this is done with reference
to Tables III and IV at the first and second significant
cash redistributions respectively. At the first event, the
order of priority of the strategies is T > F > B, leading
to the adoption of the strategies in the third column of
Table III. In response to the signal ↓↓, the outputs of
these strategies are given in the fourth column. Taking
into account the positions listed in the fifth column, the
final decisions of the agents are given in the sixth column.
Summing up the buying and selling quotations weighted
by the fractions in the second column, we obtain Abuy =
5N/9 and Asell = 3N/9. Thus, the FF and FB agents
are the minority and sell one whole unit of stock at the
price P ≈ co. Agents in the buying group have bought
3/5 unit of stocks, and have lost cash ≈ 3co/5.
At the second event, the price has fallen to just below
the cash level of the second most liquid group of agents
(FF, TT and TB), which is roughly 2co/5. At this point,
the price has fallen to a value such that the order of prior-
ity of the strategies becomes F > T > B. Consequently,
as shown in Table IV, the FT agents have changed to
be in the selling group. We obtain Abuy = 3N/9 and
Asell = 5N/9. Hence, agents in the selling group sell 3/5
unit of stocks at the price P ≈ 2co/5, and so gain cash of
the amount 6co/25. The buying agents have their cash
reduced by 2co/5.
As mentioned earlier, the maximum price Pmax is
reached when the price has just exceeded the cash level
of the most liquid agents. Therefore, Pmax ≈ 56co/25 for
type I attractors.
Considering the dynamics starting from all the 24 ini-
tial conditions, we classify the TS attractors into three
types as shown in Table V. Their maximum price and
the distribution of the final cash are described in Ap-
pendix. Although the amplitudes of the price cycles of
the three types of attractors are different, their dynamics
are qualitatively the same.
We have also studied the dynamics of the TS attrac-
tors at other values of K and (γ, β), but whose locations
are not close to the boundary of the TS phase. We found
TS attractors with approximately the same amplitudes
of 56co/25, 2co, 8co/5, but we also found attractors with
other amplitudes such as 14co/5 and 72co/35. An ex-
haustive search of all possible amplitudes is beyond the
scope of our study. Since they have qualitatively similar
behaviors, we will continue our analysis using only the
three types of attractors we have described.
V. PERIODS OF THE PRICE CYCLES
After obtaining an estimate of the amplitudes of the
price cycles in the previous section, we can derive the
periods of the price cycles if we also know about the price
change per time step. This information is also available
from Table IV for type I attractor.
Consider the falling trend from the peak price of
Pmax ≈ 56co/25 to the valley P ≈ −56co/25. From
Tables III and IV, we find that Asell = 3N/9 from
P = 56co/25 to P = 16co/25, and Asell = 5N/9 from
P = 16co/25 to P = −56co/25. Hence, the period of the
price cycles is given by
TI
2
=
(
3N
9
)−γ (
56
25
co − 16
25
co
)
+
(
5N
9
)−γ (
16
25
co +
56
25
co
)
. (18)
This reveals the dependence of the period on co and γ
TI =
(
16co
25Nγ
)[
5 (3γ) + 9
(
9
5
)γ]
. (19)
The periods of types II and III attractors are derived
in Appendix. To compare with simulation results, we
calculate the harmonic mean of the periods averaged over
9TABLE III: The outputs, positions, decisions and final cash (roughly in multiples of co) of the agents at the first significant
cash redistribution event of a type I TS attractor.
Agents Fraction Strategy Output Position Decision Final cash
FF 1/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 2
FT 2/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 2/5
FB 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 2
TT 1/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 2/5
TB 2/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 2/5
BB 1/9 B sell = −K hold 1
TABLE IV: The outputs, positions, decisions and final cash (roughly in multiples of co) of the agents at the second significant
cash redistribution event of a type I TS attractor.
Agents Fraction Strategy Output Position Decision Final cash
FF 1/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 56/25
FT 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 16/25
FB 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 56/25
TT 1/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
TB 2/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
BB 1/9 B sell = −K hold 1
TABLE V: The three types of TS attractors at (γ, β) =
(0.2, 0.8), m = 2, s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100. In
the initial conditions, ∗ represents ↑ or ↓. Only the 12 initial
conditions that give rise to an initial rising trend during the
separation stage are included in the third column. The other
12 initial conditions, related to those in the fourth column
by gauge transformation ↑↔↓ and T↔B, belong to the same
corresponding type of attractor.
Attractor Most liquid agents Initial condition Pmax
Type I FF and FB (∗∗, T > F > B) 56co/25
Type II FT (∗↓, T > B > F) 2co
Type III FB (∗↑, T > B > F) 8co/5
FF and FT and FB
(∗↑, F > B > T)
(∗↑, F > T > B)
the initial conditions. From Table V, the probabilities of
occurrence are 1/3, 1/6 and 1/2 for types I, II and III
attractors respectively. Hence the average period of TS
attractors is
Tav =
(
1
3
T−1I +
1
6
T−1II +
1
2
T−1III
)−1
. (20)
Substituting Eqs. (19), (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain
Tav =
16co
Nγ
×{
25
3 [5 (3γ) + 9 (9/5)
γ
]
+
1
3 (3γ)
+
5
4
(
5
9
)γ}−1
.
(21)
So far we have derived this expression for a particular
value of γ (= 0.2). Observing that the attractor struc-
tures in a broad range of γ are qualitatively similar, we
extrapolate this result to general values of γ. Interpo-
lating the expression by an exponential function of γ be-
tween γ = 0 and γ = 1, we have
lnTav ≈ B −mγ, (22)
where B = ln (448co/61) and m = ln (3514N/7137).
Figure 7 shows the average TS period for co = 100 ob-
tained from simulations. It shows that the period is an
exponential function of γ. B and m in the figure are de-
termined experimentally to be 6.71 and 6.13 respectively.
This compares favorably with the theoretical prediction
of Eq. (22) which yields B = 6.60 and m = 6.20.
VI. THE PHASE BOUNDARY
To search for the existence condition of the TS phase,
we plot the period of the TS attractors as a function of
γ for various co in Fig. 8. Remarkably, the TS attrac-
tors disappear when the period falls below an apparently
universal value, suggesting that there is a lower bound of
the TS period around 4K + 5.
This possibility is further supported by the numerical
experiment described in Fig. 9. We start the Wealth
Game with an initial condition biased towards the F
strategy, but at a very high value of γ deep in the BO
phase. This favors the TS attractor in the transient stage,
which is expected to be destabilized at the steady state.
We observe that the virtual wealth of the F strategy de-
creases from one period to another and is accompanied by
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The dependence of the TS period on
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co = 100.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The dependence of the TS period on γ
averaged over the 12 possible attractors for various co down
to the boundary of the TS phase. The line corresponds to the
bound of 4K + 5. The parameters are s = 2, K = 3, β = 0.5,
N = 1000.
periods of the TS attractor shorter than 4K + 5. Mean-
while, the virtual wealth of the B (or T) strategy keeps on
increasing period after period. Eventually, the F strategy
is outperformed by the B strategy and the TS attractor
disappears.
Let us analyze the attractors with the shortest possible
TS period. As shown in Fig. 10 for a TS attractor, the
F strategy starts from the minimum position −K at the
beginning of stages 1 and 2, and takes buying actions in
response to the signal ↑↑ for 2K steps. This continues
until it reaches the maximum position K. A quiet period
follows. The signal at the first step of the quiet period
is ↑↑, but the signals in the following steps are random.
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FIG. 9: The transient existence of the TS attractor at
(γ, β) = (0.65, 0.5) starting with the following virtual cash
of the strategies: cF = 2000N
γ , cT = cB = 0, for (a) the price
series, where the inset shows the magnified plot of the TS
regime and (b) the virtual wealth series. Other parameters
are: s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000,co = 100.
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FIG. 10: The time series of (a) the price and (b) the virtual
wealth of the F strategy in a half-period of the TS attractor at
(γ, β) = (0.55, 0.8), s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100. Note
that in general, the F strategy requires 2K steps to regain
the virtual wealth at the previous quiet period when β ≤ 0.5,
and 2K + 1 steps when β > 0.5.
If the signal is ↑, the quiet period continues, but if the
signal is ↓, all strategies respond to ↑↓ by selling, and the
dynamics enters stage 3. Hence the average length of the
quiet period is 1 +
∑∞
n=0 n/2
n+1 = 2.
When the falling price trend of stage 3 starts, the F
strategy makes the right move of selling, but its position
remains positive due to the rising trend in stages 1 and
2. It takes the strategy K steps to change its position to
0. As shown in Fig. 10, it is losing virtual wealth during
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this period of time. It takes another K steps to change
its position from zero to minimum, and the strategy is
regaining virtual wealth during this period. For these
2K steps, its virtual wealth gain and loss are roughly
balanced. This completes the adjustment stage of the
F strategy. If the falling trend is longer than 2K steps,
then the strategy can start to gain virtual wealth using
its trend-following outputs and stabilize the TS attractor.
To make a more quantitative estimate, we consider the
case γ = 0, in which the price change at each step is
A0 = 1, independent of the volume of buying and selling
quotations. By tracing the virtual wealth change of the
F strategy during a price cycle of length 4K+ 4 (with an
average length of 2 during the quiet periods at the peaks
and valleys), the virtual wealth gain of the F strategy
is calculated to be 2K(1 − 2β), whereas those of the T
and B strategies are 1. When the period of the price cy-
cle lengthens, the virtual wealth gain of the F strategy
increases by K for every extension of the period by one
step. If we consider the mid-position of the phase dia-
gram with β = 1/2, then for price cycles of period 4K+5,
the F strategy outperforms the T and B strategies by
2K(1− 2β) +K − 1 = K − 1. Hence for K > 1, it is rea-
sonable to estimate the phase boundary by the condition
that the period of the price cycle becomes 4K + 5 ≡ Tc.
We are now ready to calculate the critical value γc of
the TS attractor at the phase boundary. However, we
observe in Fig. 2 that the transition to the BO phase
occurs within a narrow but finite range of γ, instead of
having an abrupt change. This is due to the dependence
on the initial conditions, as classified according to the
three types of attractors. By equating Tc to the periods
in Eqs. (19), (A.1) and (A.2), we find that γc takes the
values of 0.65, 0.66 and 0.57 for types I, II and III at-
tractors respectively. The phase lines for types II and
III attractors are located in the phase diagrams in Fig.
11, and the matching with the simulation results is quite
well.
VII. DEPENDENCE ON POPULATION
COMPOSITION
So far, we have considered the case of unbiased assign-
ment of strategies, that is , fF : fT : fB = 1 : 1 : 1, where
fσ is the ratio of the probabilities of assigning strategies σ
to an agent. It is interesting to consider how the market
dynamics changes when we vary the ratio of strategies
to fF : fT : fB = f : 1 : 1, where f is referred to as
the trendsetter (TS) factor. Figure 12 shows the phase
diagram in the space of f and γ. The TS phase exists for
sufficiently large f and sufficiently small γ. This suggests
that in order to trigger the TS price trends, the market
should be dominated by enough trendsetting strategies.
In other words, a market is trendy only when there are
enough trend-believing agents. In contrast, if the game
is full of T and B strategies, it becomes a market with
fundamentalists as the majority, and price trends can-
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Comparison of the theoretical predic-
tion of γc with the simulation results for (a) co = 100 and (b)
co = 925. Other parameters are s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000 (20
samples).
not be set up easily. Such a picture shows qualitative
consistency with the results obtained in [14], where a po-
larization parameter determines the statistical weight of
trend-following strategies, and the periodic phase exists
at high polarization.
The vertical segment of the phase boundary in Fig. 12
shows little dependence on f , indicating that our analysis
at f = 1 is a good approximation. To analyze the hori-
zontal segment, we consider the typical attractor profile
below and above the phase boundary in Fig. 13. Note
that at the transient stage, the price series in both cases
appear as TS. The difference lies in the behavior on ap-
proaching the steady state. When f is small, the F-group
agents (FF, FT and FB) are the minority. In the ab-
sence of market makers, the need to balance the buying
and selling volumes has significant consequences in deter-
mining the types of agents whose positions are saturated
(that is, reach ±K). Hence, we show the evolvement of
the agents’ positions in Fig. 14 during the separation
stage for two typical cases. In these cases the position of
the F-group agents saturate at K; the cases of −K have
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FIG. 12: (Color online) The phase diagram in the space of the
F strategy factor f and price sensitivity γ. Other parameters
are s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000, co = 100, β = 0.5 (20 samples).
the same behavior after gauge transformation.
The outcome of the separation stage is that the TT and
F-group agents take up positive positions at the steady
state, and the BB and TB agents have negative positions.
Note that at the steady state, the only active sellers with
unsaturated positions are the TB agents in Fig. 14(a),
and the TB and BB agents in Fig. 14(b). More signif-
icantly, the F-group agents have saturated positive po-
sitions. Once their positions are saturated, their buying
quotations disappear. The TS price trend stops, and the
steady state enters the bouncing attractor.
This transition mechanism from the TS transient to
the BO attractor is further confirmed by the dynamics
of agents’ positions when f is increased to enter the TS
phase, as shown in Fig. 15. Since f is larger when com-
pared with Fig. 14, the TB and BB agents saturate at
position −K before the F-group agents reaches position
K. The result is exactly the opposite: the selling quotes
of the TB and BB agents disappear, and the price con-
tinues to rise. More important, the F-group agents re-
main unsaturated. They emerge as active agents with
the freedom to make buying and selling quotes, and the
TS attractor is sustainable at the steady state.
This transition mechanism enables us to derive the
macroscopic condition for the disappearance of the TS
phase, irrespective of the transaction details. The total
volume of stocks that can be sold by the BB and TB
agents is Vs = 3NK/(2+f)
2. The total volume of stocks
that can be bought by the TT and F-group agents is
Vb = NK(f
2 + 4f + 1)/(2 + f)2. If Vb < Vs, the F-group
agents become saturated and remain inactive. Thus we
have the BO phase when f <
√
6− 2 ≈ 0.449. This pre-
diction matches well with the simulation result in Fig.
12.
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FIG. 13: The price series of an attractor before and after
undergoing the phase transition at (a) f = 0.4 (b) f = 0.5.
The middle plot and the top table are the magnified graph of
the price series and the positions of different agents at stable
states. Other parameters are m = 2, s = 2, K = 3, N = 1000,
co = 100, (γ, β) = (0.2, 0.8), initial condition (↑↑,T > F > B).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered a simplified Wealth Game in which
no market makers are present. Since buying and sell-
ing quotations are not balanced, the dynamics becomes
complicated. Furthermore, due to the prevalence of dry
quotations, the dynamics becomes heavily dependent on
the initial conditions. This makes it difficult to analyze
the model and understand its underlying mechanism. To
circumvent this difficulty, we simplify the input dimen-
sion of the strategies to 2 and restrict the strategies to
three representative ones, namely, F, T and B. Respec-
tively, they represent the trend-followers/trendsetters,
optimistic and pessimistic fundamentalists in the mar-
ket.
With these simplifications, we observe a dynamical
transition from the TS phase to the BO phase when γ in-
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The price series is also shown for reference. Parameters: s =
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FIG. 15: (Color online) Same as Fig. 14, except that f = 0.5.
creases. Despite the simplicity of the model, both phases
bear characteristics of real markets. The TS phase pro-
duces price trends that resemble bubbles and crashes in
real markets. They are observed when the agents have
enough cash, and the price movement is not very sen-
sitive to the excess demand. The BO phase produces
price trends that are relatively steady, with occasional
up-bounces or down-bounces followed by relaxations to
fundamental prices. These price trends can also be ob-
served in real markets when investors have very cautious
moods about the fundamental values of the stocks. Both
phases are dominated by dry quotations, which corre-
spond to quiet moments in real markets with very low
trading volumes. In many economic systems, such as the
real estates market, dry quotations are prevalent when
the price is too high or too low.
We find that the amplitude of the price cycles is deter-
mined by the cash level of the most liquid agents. When
agents with less cash stop their quotations, the more liq-
uid agents can still boost up or push down the price to
higher or lower levels. Prices reach their extreme val-
ues when the agents consider it too risky to participate.
However, the quantitative relation between the price am-
plitude and the initial cash is determined by the cash re-
distribution process during the transient stage. To over-
come the complexity of this process, we adopt a semi-
empirical approach by analyzing the separation stage for
various initial conditions, and extrapolating the predic-
tions to the entire TS phase. Agreement with simulation
results shows that this is a good approximation.
Our study also suggests a mechanism for the disap-
pearance of the TS phase. All trend-following strategies
need an adaptation period when the price trend reverses.
Agents become certain of the advantages of these strate-
gies only when the duration of a price trend is longer
than that of the adaptation period. When the price sen-
sitivity increases, the price change per step increases, and
the period of the price cycles shortens. When the period
becomes comparable to the adaptation period, the TS
attractor becomes unsustainable.
We also find that the composition of the population
affects the market behavior. The TS phase is present
in markets where trend-following strategies are popular.
When the trend-following strategies become less popu-
lar, we observe a phase transition to the bouncing phase.
We find that this transition is due to the fact that the
positions of the trend-followers saturate at the maximum
(or minimum), and no active agents want to buy (or sell)
when they decide to sell (or buy). This allows us to de-
rive a macroscopic condition for the phase transition by
balancing the volume of supply and demand of stocks.
The prediction agrees with the simulation results well.
It is interesting to compare our model with the Wealth
Game with the market makers present [12]. In both
cases, the TS phase exists due to the presence of trend-
followers. However, when market makers are present,
the price trend is driven by real transactions and has a
slightly different dynamics. For example, the so-called
fickle agents are those who hold a T and B strategy, and
fickle their preference between the two strategies with a
delayed response. They push the price further up in a
rising trend, and down in a falling trend, thus creating
opportunities for the trend-followers to gain wealth. In
our model without market makers, the fickle agents do
not play an important role. During the separation stage,
their cash is reduced to a very low level, as evident in
Tables IV, VI and VII for types I to III attractors re-
spectively. Hence they only play a minor role in the price
dynamics.
While our model is successful in explaining and in-
terpreting a number of market phenomena, it can be
further improved to address a broader range of issues.
One possible modification to this model is to implement
the injection of cash to the market. This may help to
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relieve the problem of too many dry quotations in the
present model, whose agents are restricted by the cash
rule. Furthermore, since the present model is a close
system with constant average wealth, incorporating cash
injection may cause the market to evolve spontaneously
towards states which have maximal attraction of capi-
tal. In this way, it will also address the issue of the self-
organization of markets, which has drawn considerable
attention in recent models [12, 14, 22–24].
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Appendix: Periods of Types II and III Attractors
In a type II attractor, there is only one significant cash
redistribution event during the separation stage. It takes
place during a falling trend, and the order of priority of
the strategies is F > T > B. Both FB and BB agents
have reached their minimum positions. As calculated in
Table VI, Abuy = Asell = 3N/9, and the maximum final
cash is 2co. Hence Pmax ≈ 2co.
The period of type II attractor is
TII =
8co
Nγ
3γ . (A.1)
In a type III attractor, there is often only one sig-
nificant cash redistribution event during the separation
stage. It takes place during a falling trend, and the order
of priority of the strategies is F > T > B. Only the BB
agents have reached their minimum positions. As calcu-
lated in Table VII, Abuy = 3N/9 and Asell = 5N/9, and
the maximum final cash is 8co/5. Hence Pmax ≈ 8co/5.
Besides the single event described in Table VII, there
are also initial conditions which result in TT and TB
holding slightly different amount of cash before signifi-
cant cash redistribution occurs. This gives rise to the
occurrence of two events, but the final cash distribution
remains the same.
The period of type III attractor is
TIII =
32co
5Nγ
(
9
5
)γ
. (A.2)
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TABLE VI: The outputs, positions, decisions and final cash (in multiples of co) of the agents at the cash redistribution event
of a type II attractor.
Agents Fraction Strategy Output Position Decision Final cash
FF 1/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 2
FT 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 2
FB 2/9 F sell = −K hold 1
TT 1/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
TB 2/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
BB 1/9 B sell = −K hold 1
TABLE VII: The outputs, positions, decisions and final cash (in multiples of co) of the agents at the cash redistribution event
of a type III attractor.
Agents Fraction Strategy Output Position Decision Final cash
FF 1/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 8/5
FT 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 8/5
FB 2/9 F sell ≥ −K + 1 sell 8/5
TT 1/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
TB 2/9 T buy ≤ K − 1 buy 0
BB 1/9 B sell = −K hold 1
